Abstract-The infrastructure cloud (IaaS) service model offers improved resource flexibility and availability, where tenants -insulated from the minutiae of hardware maintenance -rent computing resources to deploy and operate complex systems. Large-scale services running on IaaS platforms demonstrate the viability of this model; nevertheless, many organizations operating on sensitive data avoid migrating operations to IaaS platforms due to security concerns. In this paper, we describe a framework for data and operation security in IaaS, consisting of protocols for a trusted launch of virtual machines and domain-based storage protection. We continue with an extensive theoretical analysis with proofs about protocol resistance against attacks in the defined threat model. The protocols allow trust to be established by remotely attesting host platform configuration prior to launching guest virtual machines and ensure confidentiality of data in remote storage, with encryption keys maintained outside of the IaaS domain. Presented experimental results demonstrate the validity and efficiency of the proposed protocols. The framework prototype was implemented on a test bed operating a public electronic health record system, showing that the proposed protocols can be integrated into existing cloud environments.
INTRODUCTION
C LOUD computing has progressed from a bold vision to massive deployments in various application domains. However, the complexity of technology underlying cloud computing introduces novel security risks and challenges. Threats and mitigation techniques for the IaaS model have been under intensive scrutiny in recent years [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , while the industry has invested in enhanced security solutions and issued best practice recommendations [5] . From an end-user point of view the security of cloud infrastructure implies unquestionable trust in the cloud provider, in some cases corroborated by reports of external auditors. While providers may offer security enhancements such as protection of data at rest, end-users have limited or no control over such mechanisms. There is a clear need for usable and cost-effective cloud platform security mechanisms suitable for organizations that rely on cloud infrastructure.
One such mechanism is platform integrity verification for compute hosts that support the virtualized cloud infrastructure. Several large cloud vendors have signaled practical implementations of this mechanism, primarily to protect the cloud infrastructure from insider threats and advanced persistent threats. We see two major improvement vectors regarding these implementations. First, details of such proprietary solutions are not disclosed and can thus not be implemented and improved by other cloud platforms. Second, to the best of our knowledge, none of the solutions provides cloud tenants a proof regarding the integrity of compute hosts supporting their slice of the cloud infrastructure. To address this, we propose a set of protocols for trusted launch of virtual machines (VM) in IaaS, which provide tenants with a proof that the requested VM instances were launched on a host with an expected software stack.
Another relevant security mechanism is encryption of virtual disk volumes, implemented and enforced at compute host level. While support data encryption at rest is offered by several cloud providers and can be configured by tenants in their VM instances, functionality and migration capabilities of such solutions are severely restricted. In most cases cloud providers maintain and manage the keys necessary for encryption and decryption of data at rest. This further convolutes the already complex data migration procedure between different cloud providers, disadvantaging tenants through a new variation of vendor lock-in. Tenants can choose to encrypt data on the operating system (OS) level within their VM environments and manage the encryption keys themselves. However, this approach suffers from several drawbacks: first, the underlying compute host will still have access encryption keys whenever the VM performs cryptographic operations; second, this shifts towards the tenant the burden of maintaining the encryption software in all their VM instances and increases the attack surface; third, this requires injecting, migrating and later securely withdrawing encryption keys to each of the VM instances with access to the encrypted data, increasing the probability than an attacker eventually obtains the keys. In this paper we present domain-based storage protection (DBSP), a virtual disk encryption mechanism where encryption of data is done directly on the compute host, while the key material necessary for re-generating encryption keys is stored in the volume metadata. This approach allows easy migration of encrypted data volumes and withdraws the control of the cloud provider over disk encryption keys. In addition, DBSP significantly reduces the risk of exposing encryption keys and keeps a low maintenance overhead for the tenant -in the same time providing additional control over the choice of the compute host based on its software stack.
We focus on the infrastructure-as-a-service model -in a simplified form, it exposes to its tenants a coherent platform supported by compute hosts which operate VM guests that communicate through a virtual network. The system model chosen for this paper is based on requirements identified while migrating a currently deployed, distributed electronic health record (EHR) system to an IaaS platform [6] .
Contribution
We extend previous work applying Trusted Computing to strengthen IaaS security, allowing tenants to place hard security requirements on the infrastructure and maintain exclusive control of the security critical assets. We propose a security framework consisting of three buiding blocks:
Protocols for trusted launch of VM instances in IaaS; Key management and encryption enforcement functions for VMs, providing transparent encryption of persistent data storage in the cloud; Key management and security policy enforcement by a Trusted Third Party (TTP); We describe several contributions that enhance cloud infrastructure with additional security mechanisms:
1. We describe a trusted VM launch (TL) protocol which allows tenants -referred to as domain managers -to launch VM instances exclusively on hosts with an attested platform configuration and reliably verify this. 2. We introduce a domain-based storage protection protocol to allow domain managers store encrypted data volumes partitioned according to administrative domains. 3. We introduce a list of attacks applicable to IaaS environments and use them to develop protocols with desired security properties, perform their security analysis and prove their resistance against the attacks. 4. We describe the implementation of the proposed protocols on an open-source cloud platform and present extensive experimental results that demonstrate their practicality and efficiency.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe relevant related work on trusted virtual machine launch and cloud storage protection. In Section 3.1 we introduce the system model, as well as the threat model and problem statement. In Section 4 we introduce the protocol components, and the TL and DBSP protocols as formal constructions. In Section 5, we provide a security analysis and prove the resistance of the protocols against the defined attacks, while implementation and performance evaluation results are described in Section 6. We discuss the protocol application domain in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
We start with a review of related work on trusted VM launch, followed by storage protection in IaaS.
Trusted Launch
Santos et al. [1] proposed a "Trusted Cloud Compute Platform" (TCCP) to ensure VMs are running on a trusted hardware and software stack on a remote and initially untrusted host. To enable this, a trusted coordinator stores the list of attested hosts that run a "trusted virtual machine monitor" which can securely run the client's VM. Trusted hosts maintain in memory an individual trusted key used for identification each time a client launches a VM. The paper presents a good initial set of ideas for trusted VM launch and migration, in particular the use of a trusted coordinator. A limitation of this solution is that the trusted coordinator maintains information about all hosts deployed on the IaaS platform, making it a valuable target to an adversary who attempts to expose the public IaaS provider to privacy attacks. A decentralized approach to integrity attestation is adopted by Schiffman et al. [2] to address the limited transparency of IaaS platforms and scalability limits imposed by third party integrity attestation mechanisms. The authors describe a trusted architecture where tenants verify the integrity of IaaS hosts through a trusted cloud verifier proxy placed in the cloud provider domain. Tenants evaluate the cloud verifier integrity, which in turn attests the hosts. Once the VM image has been verified by the host and countersigned by the cloud verifier, the tenant can allow the launch. The protocol increases the complexity for tenants both by introducing the evaluation of integrity attestation reports of the cloud verifier and host and by adding steps to the trusted VM launch, where the tenant must act based on the data returned from the cloud verifier. Our protocol maintains the VM launch traceability and transparency without relying on a proxy verifier residing in the IaaS. Furthermore, the TL protocol does not require additional tenant interaction to launch the VM on a trusted host, beyond the initial launch arguments.
Platform attestation prior to VM launch is also applied in [7] , which introduces two protocols -"TPM-based certification of a Remote Resource" (TCRR) and "VerifyMyVM". With TCRR a tenant can verify the integrity of a remote host and establish a trusted channel for further communication.
In "VerifyMyVM", the hypervisor running on an attested host uses an emulated TPM to verify on-demand the integrity of running VMs. Our approach is in many aspects similar to the one in [7] in particular with regard to host attestation prior to VM instance launch. However, the approach in [7] requires the user to always encrypt the VM image before instantiation, thus complicating image management. This prevents tenants from using commodity VM images offered by the cloud provider for trusted VM launches. We overcome this limitation and generalize the solution by adding a verification token, created by the tenant and injected on the file system of the VM instance only if it is launched on an attested cloud host.
In [8] , the authors described a protocol for trusted VM launch on public IaaS using trusted computing techniques. To ensure that the requested VM instance is launched on a host with attested integrity, the tenant encrypts the VM image (along with all injected data) with a symmetric key sealed to a particular configuration of the host reflected in the values of the platform configuration registers (PCR) of the TPM placed on the host. The proposed solution is suitable in trusted VM launch scenarios for enterprise tenants as it requires that the VM image is pre-packaged and encrypted by the client prior to IaaS launch. However, similar to [7] , this prevents tenants from using commodity VM images offered by the cloud provider to launch VM instances on trusted cloud hosts. Furthermore, we believe that reducing the number of steps required from the tenant can facilitate the adoption of the trusted IaaS model. We extend some of the ideas proposed in [8] , address the above limitations -such as additional actions required from tenantsand also address the requirements towards the launched VM instance and required changes to cloud platforms.
Secure Storage
Cooper and Martin described in in [9] a secure platform architecture based on a secure root of trust for grid environments -precursors of cloud computing. Trusted Computing is used as a method for dynamic trust establishment within the grid, allowing clients to verify that their data wil be protected against malicious host attacks. The authors address the malicious host problem in grid environments, with three main risk factors: trust establishment, code isolation and grid middleware. The solution established a minimal trusted computing base (TCB) by introducing a security manager isolated by the hypervisor from grid services (which are in turn performed within VM instances). The secure architecture is supported by protocols for data integrity protection, confidentiality protection and grid job attestation. In turn, these rely of client attestation of the host running the respective jobs, followed by interaction with the security manager to fulfill the goals of the respective protocols. We follow a similar approach in terms of interacting with a minimal TCB for protocol purposes following host attestation. However, in order to adapt to the cloud computing model we delegate the task of host attestation to an external TTP as well as use TPM functionality to ensure that sensitive cryptographic material can only be accessed on a particular attested host.
In [10] , the authors proposed an approach to protect access to outsourced data in an owner-write-users-read case, assuming an "honest but curious service provider". Encryption is done over (abstract) blocks of data, with a different key per block. The authors suggest a key derivation hierarchy based on a public hash function, using the hash function result as the encryption key. The scheme allows to selectively grant data access, uses over-encryption to revoke access rights and supports block deletion, update, insertion and appending. It adopts a lazy revocation model, allowing to indefinitely maintain access to data reachable prior to revocation (regardless of whether it has been accessed before access revocation). While this solution is similar to our model with regard to information blocks and encryption with different symmetric keys, we propose an active revocation model, where the keys are cached for a limited time and cannot be retrieved once the access is revoked.
The "Data-Protection-as-a-Service" (DPaaS) platform [11] balances the requirements for confidentiality and privacy with usability, availability and maintainability. DPaaS focuses on shareable logical data units, confined in isolated partitions (e.g., VMs of language-based features such as Caja, Javascript) or containers, called Secure Execution Environments (SEE). Data units are encrypted with symmetric keys and can be stored on untrusted hardware, while containers communicate through authenticated channels. The authors stress the verifiability of DPaaS using trusted computing and the use of the dynamic root of trust to guarantee that computation is performed on a "secure" platform. The authors posit that DPaaS fulfills confidentiality and privacy requirements and facilitates maintenance, logging and audit; provider migration is one of the aspects highlighted, but not addressed in [11] . Our solution resembles DPaaS in the use of SEE based on software attestation mechanisms offered by the TPM, and in the reliance on full disk encryption to protect data at rest and support for flexible access control management of the data blocks. However, the architecture outlined in [11] does not address bootstrapping the platform (e.g., the VM launch) and provides few details about the key management mechanism for the secure data store. We address the above shortcomings, by describing in detail and evaluating protocols to create and share confidentiality-protected data blocks. We describe cloud storage security mechanisms that allow easy data migration between providers without affecting its confidentiality.
Graf et al. [12] presented an IaaS storage protection scheme addressing access control. The authors analyse access rights management of shared versioned encrypted data on cloud infrastructure for a restricted group and propose a scalable and flexible key management scheme. Access rights are represented as a graph, making a distinction between data encryption keys and encrypted updates on the keys and enabling flexible join/leave client operations, similar to properties presented by the protocols in this paper. Despite its advantages, the requirement for client-side encryption limits the applicability of the scheme in [12] and introduces important functional limitations on indexing and search. In our model, all cryptographic operations are performed on trusted IaaS compute hosts, which are able to allocate more computational resources than client devices.
Santos et al. [13] proposed Excalibur, a system using trusted computing mechanisms to allow decrypting client data exclusively on nodes that satisfy a tenant-specified policy. Excalibur introduces a new trusted computing abstraction, policy-sealed data to address the fact that TPM abstractions are designed to protect data and secrets on a standalone machine, at the same time over-exposing the cloud infrastructure by revealing the identity and software fingerprint of individual cloud hosts. The authors extended TCCP [1] to address the limitations of binary-based attestation and data sealing by using property-based attestation [14] . The core of Excalibur is 'the monitor', which is a part of the cloud provider, which organises computations across a series of hosts and provides guarantees to tenants. Tenants first decide a policy and receive evidence regarding the status of the monitor along with a public encryption key, and then encrypt their data and policy using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption [15] . To decrypt, the stored data hosts receive the decryption key from the monitor who ensures that the corresponding host has a valid status and satisfies the policy specified by the client at encryption time. Our solution is similar to the one in [13] , with some important differences: 1) In contrast with [13] our protocols were implemented as a code extension for Openstack. Furthermore, the presented measurements were made after we deployed the protocols for a part of the Swedish electronic health records management system in an infrastructure cloud. Thus, our measures are considered as realistic since the experiments were done under a real electronic healthcare system; 2) Excalibur is totally missing a security analysis. Instead authors only present the results of ProVerif (an automated tool) regarding the correctness of their protocol. In addition to that, through our security analysis we introduced a new list of attacks that can be applied to such systems. This is something that is totally missing from related works such as [13] and it can be considered as a great contribution to protocol designers since can avoid common pitfalls and design even better protocols in the future;
In [16] the authors presented a forward-looking design of a cryptographic cloud storage built on an untrusted IaaS infrastructure. The approach aims to provide confidentiality and integrity, while retaining the benefits of cloud storage -availability, reliability, efficient retrieval and data sharing -and ensuring security through cryptographic guarantees rather than administrative controls. The solution requires four client-side components: data processor, data verifier, credential generator, token generator. Important building blocks of the solution are: Symmetric searchable encryption (SSE), appropriate in settings where the data consumer is also the one who generates it (efficient for single writer-single reader (SWSR) models); Asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE), appropriate for many writer single reader (MWSR) models, offers weaker security guarantees as the server can mount a dictionary attack against the token and learn the search terms of the client; Efficient ASE, appropriate in MWSR scenarios where the search terms are hard to guess, offers efficient search but is vulnerable to dictionary attacks; Multi-user SSE, appropriate for single writer/many reader settings, allows the owner to -besides encrypting indexes and generating tokens -revoke user search privileges over data; Attribute based encryption, introduced in [17] , provides users with a decryption key with certain associated attributes, such that a message can be encrypted using a certain key and a policy. In such a scheme, the message can only be decrypted only if the policy matches the key used to encrypt it; finally, proofs of storage allow a client to verify that data integrity has not been violated by the server.
The concepts presented in [16] are promising -especially considering recent progress in searchable encryption schemes [18] . Indeed, integrating searchable and attributebased encryption mechanisms into secure storage solutions is an important direction in our future work. However, practical application of searchable encryption and attributebased encryption requires additional research.
Earlier work in [19] , [20] described interoperable solutions towards trusted VM launch and storage protection in IaaS. We extend them to create an integrated framework that builds a trust chain from the domain manager to the VM instances and data in their administrative domain, and provide additional details, proofs and performance evaluation.
SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we describe the system and threat model, as well as present the problem statement.
System Model
We assume an IaaS system model (e.g., OpenStack, a popular open-source cloud platform) as in [21] : providers expose a quota of network, computation and storage resources to its tenants -referred to as domain managers (Fig. 1) . Domain managers utilize the quota to launch and operate VM guests. Let DM ¼ DM 1 ; . . . ; DM n f g be the set of all domain managers in our IaaS. Then,
is the set of all VMs owned by each domain manager DM i . VM guests operated by DM are grouped into domains (similar to projects in OpenStack) which comprise cloud resources corresponding to a particular organization or administrative unit. DM create, modify, destroy domains and manage access permissions of VMs to data stored in the domains. We refer to
as the set of all domains created by a domain manager DM i .
Requests for operations on VMs (launch, migration, termination, etc.) received by the IaaS are managed by a scheduler that allocates (reallocates, deallocates) resources from the pool of available compute hosts according to a resource management algorithm. We assume in this work compute hosts that are physical -rather than virtual -servers. We denote the set of all compute hosts as CH ¼ CH 1 ; . . . ; f CH n g. We denote a VM instance vm i l running on a compute host CH i by vm i l 7 !CH i and its unique identifier by idvm i l . The Security Profile (SP ) , defined in [19] , is a function of the verified and measured deployment of a trusted computing base -a collection of software components measurable during a platform boot. Measurements are maintained in protected storage, usually located on the same platform. We expand this concept in Section 4. Several functionally equivalent configurations may each have a different security profile. We denote the set of all compute hosts that share the same security profile SP i as CH SP i . VMs intercommunicate through a virtual network overlay, a "software defined network" (SDN). A domain manager can create arbitrary network topologies in the same domain to interconnect the VMs without affecting network topologies in other domains.
I/O virtualization enables device aggregation and allows to combine several physical devices into a single logical device (with better properties), presented to a VM [22] . Cloud platforms use this to aggregate disparate storage devices into highly available logical devices with arbitrary storage capacity (e.g., volumes in OpenStack). VMs are presented with a logical device through a single access interface, while replication, fault-tolerance and storage aggregation are hidden in the lower abstraction layers. We refer to this logical device as storage resource (SR); as a storage unit, an SR can be any unit supported by the disk encryption subsystem.
Threat Model
We share the threat model with [1] , [8] , [19] , [20] , which is based on the Dolev-Yao adversarial model [23] and further assumes that privileged access rights can used by a remote adversary ADV to leak confidential information. ADV, e.g., a corrupted system administrator, can obtain remote access to any host maintained by the IaaS provider, but cannot access the volatile memory of guest VMs residing on the compute hosts of the IaaS provider. This property is based on the closed-box execution environment for guest VMs, as outlined in Terra [24] and further developed in [25] , [26] .
Hardware Integrity. Media revelations have raised the issue of hardware tampering en route to deployment sites [27] , [28] . We assume that the cloud provider has taken necessary technical and non-technical measures to prevent such hardware tampering.
Physical Security. We assume physical security of the data centres where the IaaS is deployed. This assumption holds both when the IaaS provider owns and manages the data center (as in the case of Amazon Web Services, Google Compute Engine, Microsoft Azure, etc.) and when the provider utilizes third party capacity, since physical security can be observed, enforced and verified through known best practices by audit organizations. This assumption is important to build higher-level hardware and software security guarantees for the components of the IaaS.
Low-Level Software Stack. We assume that at installation time, the IaaS provider reliably records integrity measurements of the low-level software stack: the Core Root of Trust for measurement; BIOS and host extensions; host platform configuration; Option ROM code, configuration and data; Initial Platform Loader code and configuration; state transitions and wake events, and a minimal hypervisor. We assume the record is kept on protected storage with read-only access and the adversary cannot tamper with it.
Network Infrastructure. The IaaS provider has physical and administrative control of the network. ADV is in full control of the network configuration, can overhear, create, replay and destroy all messages communicated between DM and their resources (VMs, virtual routers, storage abstraction components) and may attempt to gain access to other domains or learn confidential information.
Cryptographic Security. We assume encryption schemes are semantically secure and the ADV cannot obtain the plain text of encrypted messages. We also assume the signature scheme is unforgeable, i.e., the ADV cannot forge the signature of DM i and that the MAC algorithm correctly verifies message integrity and authenticity. We assume that the ADV, with a high probability, cannot predict the output of a pseudorandom function. We explicitly exclude denialof-service attacks [29] and focus on ADV that aim to compromise the confidentiality of data in IaaS.
Problem Statement
The introduced ADV has far-reaching capabilities to compromise IaaS host integrity and confidentiality. We define a set of attacks available to ADV in the above threat model.
Given that ADV has full control over the network communication within the IaaS, one of the available attacks is to inject a malicious program or back door into the VM image, prior to instantiation. Once the VM is launched and starts processing potentially sensitive information, the malicious program can leak data to an arbitrary remote location without the suspicion of the domain manager. In this case, the VM instance will not be a legitimate instance and in particular not the instance the domain manager intended to launch. We call this type of attack a VM Substitution Attack:
Definition 1 (Successful VM Substitution Attack). Assume a domain manager, DM i , intends to launch a particular virtual machine vm i l on an arbitrary compute host in the set CH SP i . An adversary, ADV, succeeds to perform a VM substitution attack if she can find a pair ðCH; vmÞ : CH 2 CH SP i ; vm 2 VM; vm 6 ¼ vm i l ; vm7 !CH, where vm will be accepted by DM i as vm i l . A more complex attack involves reading or modifying the information processed by the VM directly, from the logs and data stored on CH or from the representation of the guest VMs' drives on the CH file system. This might be non-trivial or impossible with strong security mechanisms deployed on the host; however, ADV may attempt to circumvent this through a so-called CH Substitution Attack -by launching the guest VM on a compromised CH. Depending on the technical expertise of DM i , ADV may still take the risk of deploying a concealed -but feature-rich -malicious program in the guest VM and leave a fall back option in case the malicious program is removed or prevented from functioning as intended. ADV may choose a combined VM and CH substitution attack, which allows a modified VM to be launched on a compromised host and present it to DM i as the intended VM:
Definition 3 (Successful Combined VM and CH Substitution Attack). Assume a domain manager, DM i , wishes to launch a virtual machine vm i l on a compute host in the set CH SP i . An adversary, ADV, succeeds to perform a combined CH and VM substitution attack if she can find a pair ðCH; vmÞ; CH 2 CH SP j ; SP j 6 ¼ SP i ; vm 2 VM; vm 6 ¼ vm i l ; vm7 !CH, where vm will be accepted by DM i as vm A DM i wishes to launch or has launched an arbitrary virtual
1. In this definition we exclude the possibility of legal domain sharing which would be a natural requirement for most systems. However, with our suggested definition, the legal sharing case can be covered by extending the domain manager role such that it is allowed not to a distinct entity but a role that is possibly shared between domain managers that belong to different organizations. 
PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We now describe two protocols that constitute the core of this paper's contribution. These protocols are successively applied to deploy a cloud infrastructure providing additional user guarantees of cloud host integrity and storage security. For protocol purposes, each domain manager, secure component and trusted third party has a public/private key pair (pk=sk). The private key is kept secret, while the public key is shared with the community. We assume that during the initialization phase, each entity obtains a certificate via a trusted certification authority. We first describe the cryptographic primitives used in the proposed protocols, followed by definitions of the main protocol components.
Cryptographic Primitives
The set of all binary strings of length n is denoted by 0; 1 f g n , and the set of all finite binary strings as 0; 1 f g Ã . Given a set U, we refer to the ith element as v i . Additionally, we use the following notations for cryptographic operations throughout the paper:
For an arbitrary message m 2 0; 1 f g Ã , we denote by We denote by t ¼ RANDðnÞ a random binary sequence of length n, where RANDðnÞ represents a random function that takes a binary length argument n as input and gives a random binary sequence of this length in return. 3 
Protocol Components
Disk encryption subsystem. a software or hardware component for data I/O encryption on storage devices, capable to encrypt storage units such as hard drives, software RAID volumes, partitions, files, etc. We assume a software-based subsystem, such as dm-crypt, a disk encryption subsystem using the Linux kernel Crypto API.
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). a hardware cryptographic co-processor following specifications of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [30] ; we assume CH are equipped with a TPM v1.2. The tamper-evident property facilitates monitoring CH integrity and strengthens the assumption of physical security. An active TPM records the platform boot time software state and stores it as a list of hashes in platform configuration registers. TPM v1.2 has 16 PCRs reserved for static measurements (PCR0 -PCR15), cleared upon a hard reboot. Additional runtime resettable registers (PCR16-PCR23) are available for dynamic measurements. Endorsement keys are an asymmetric key pair stored inside the TPM in the trusted platform supply chain, used to create an endorsement credential signed by the TPM vendor to certify the TPM specification compliance. A message encrypted ("bound") using a TPM's public key is decryptable only with the private key of the same TPM. Sealing is a special case of binding -bound messages are only decryptable in the platform state defined by PCR values. Platform attestation allows a remote party to authenticate a target platform and obtain a guarantee that it -up to a certain level in the boot chain -runs software that is identical to the expected one. To do this, an attester requests -accompanied by a nonce -the target platform to produce an attestation quote and the measurement aggregate, or Integrity Measurement List (IML). The TPM generates the attestation quote -a signed structure that includes the IML and the received nonce -and returns the quote and the IML itself. The attestation quote is signed with the TPMs Attestation Identity Key (AIK). The exact IML contents are implementation-specific, but should contain enough data to allow the verifier to establish the target platform [31] integrity. We refer to [30] for a description of the TPM, and to [7] , [19] , [20] for protocols that use TPM functionality.
Trusted Third Party. an entity trusted by the other components. TTP verifies the TPM endorsement credentials on hosts operated by the cloud provider and enrolls the respective TPMs' AIKs by issuing a signed AIK certificate. We assume that TTP has access to an access control list (ACL) describing access and ownership relations between and . Furtermore, TTP communicates with CH to exchange integrity attestation data, authentication tokens and cryptographic keys. TTP can attest platform integrity based on the 2. Alternative notations used for clarity are m f g pk or m h i pk .
3. We assume that a true random function in our constructions is replaced by a pseudorandom function the input-output behaviour of which is "computationally indistinguishable" from that of a true random function.
integrity attestation quotes and the valid AIK certificate from a TPM, and seal data to a trusted host configuration. Finally, TTP can verify the authenticity of DM and perform necessary cryptographic operations. In this paper, we treat the TTP as a "black box" with a limited, well-defined functionality, and omit its internals. Availability of the TTP is essential in the cloud scenario -we refer the reader to the rich body of work on fault tolerance for approaches to building highly available systems.
Secure Component (SC). this is a verifiable execution module performing confidentiality and integrity protection operations on VM guest data. SC is present on all CH and is responsible for enforcing the protocol; it acts as a mediator between the DM and the TTP and forwards the requests from DM to either the TTP or the disk encryption subsystem. SC must be placed in an isolated execution environment, as in the approaches presented in [25] , [26] .
Trusted Launch Construction
We now present our construction for the TL, with four participating entities: domain manager, secure component, trusted third party and cloud provider (with the 'scheduler' as part of it). TL comprises a public-key encryption scheme, a signature scheme and a token generator. Fig. 2 shows the protocol message flow (some details omitted for clarity).
TL:Setup : Each entity obtains a public/private key pair and publishes its public key. Below we provide the list of key pairs used in the following protocol:
(pk DM i ; sk DM i ) -public/private key pair for DM i ; (pk TTP ; sk TTP ) -public/private key pair for TTP; (pk TPM ; sk TPM ) -TPM bind key pair; DM i encrypts m 1 with pk TTP by running c 1 ¼ Enc pk TTP m 1 ð Þ. Next, DM i generates a random nonce r and sends the following arguments to initiate a trusted VM launch procedure: c 1 ; SP i ; pk DM i ; r , where c 1 is the encrypted message generated in TL:Token, SP i is the requested security profile and pk DM i is the public key of DM i . The message is signed with sk DM i , producing s DM i . Upon reception, the scheduler assigns the VM launch to an appropriate host with a security profile SP i , e.g., host CH i . In all further steps, the nonce r and the signature of the message are used to verify the freshness of the received messages.
Upon reception, SC verifies message integrity and TL:Token freshness by checking respectively the signature s DM i and nonce r. When SC first receives a TL:Request message, it uses the local TPM to generate a new pair of TPMbased public/private bind keys, ðpk TPM ; sk TPM Þ, which can be reused for future launch requests, to avoid the costly key generation procedure. Keys can be periodically regenerated according to a cloud provider-defined policy. To prove that the bind keys are non-migratable, PCR-locked, public/private TPM keys, SC retrieves the TPM_CERTIFY_INFO structure, signed with the TPM attestation identity key pk AIK [30] using the TPM_CERTIFY_KEY TPM command; we denote this signed structure by s TCI . TPM_CERTIFY_INFO contains the bind key hash and the PCR value required to use the key; PCR values must not necessarily be in a trusted state to create a trusted bind key pair. This mechanism is explained in further detail in [19] .
Next, SC sends an attestation request (TL:AttestRequest) to the TTP, containing the encrypted message (c 1 ) generated by DM i in TL:Token, the nonce r and the attestation data (AttestData), used by the TTP to evaluate the security profile of CH i and generate the corresponding TPM bind keys. SC also requests the TPM to sign the message with sk AIK , producing s AIK . AttestData includes the following:
-the public TPM bind key pk TPM ; -the TPM_CERTIFY_INFO structure; -s TCI : signature of TPM_CERTIFY_INFO using sk AIK ; -IML, the integrity measurement list; -the TCI-certificate; Upon reception, TTP verifies the integrity and freshness of TL:AttestRequest, checking respectively the signature s AIK and nonce r. Next, TTP verifies -according to its ACL -the set D ð Þ, decomposing it into t; H 1 ; H 2 ; SP i . Finally, TTP runs an attestation scheme to validate the received attestation information and generate a new attestation token.
Definition 6 (Attestation Scheme
). An attestation scheme, denoted by TL:Attestation, is defined by two algorithms ðAttestVerify; AttestTokenÞ such that:
1. AttestVerify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the encrypted message from the requesting DM i and attestation data, c 1 ; AttestData h i , and outputs a result bit b. If the attestation result is positive, b ¼ 1; otherwise, b ¼ 0. We denote this by b :¼ AttestVerifyðc 1 ; s AIK ; AttestDataÞ. 2. AttestToken is a probabilistic algorithm that produces a TPM-sealed attestation token. The input of the algorithm is the result of AttestVerify, the message m to be sealed and the CH AttestData. If AttestVerify evaluates to b ¼ 1, the algorithm outputs an encrypted message c 2 . We write this as c 2 AttestTokenðb; m; AttestDataÞ. Otherwise, if AttestVerify evaluates to b ¼ 0, AttestToken returns ?.
In the attestation step, TTP first runs AttestVerify to determine the trustworthiness of the target CH i . In AttestVerify, TTP verifies the signature s TCI and s AIK against a valid AIK certificate contained in AttestData and examines the entries provided in the IML. to the trusted platform configuration of CH i , using the key pk TPM received through the attestation request. The encrypted message (c 2 AttestTokenðb; m 2 ; AttestDataÞ; r), along with a signature (s TTP ) produced using sk TTP is returned to SC.
Upon reception, SC checks the message integrity and freshness before unsealing it using the corresponding TPM bind key sk TPM and only in that case injects t into the VM image. Likewise, SC verifies that the public key registered by DM i with the cloud provider in step TL:Setup has not been altered, i.e., H 2 ¼ H 0 2 and only in that case injects pk DM i into the VM image prior to launching it.
In the last protocol step, DM i verifies that vm i l has been launched on a trusted platform with security profile SP i , while vm i l verifies the authenticity of DM i . This is done by establishing a secure pre-shared key TLS session [32] between vm i l and DM i using t as the pre-shared secret.
Domain-Based Storage Protection Construction
We now continue with a description of the DBSP protocol.
Along with three of the entities already active in the TL protocol -domain manager, secure component, the trusted third party -DBSP employs a fourth one: the storage resource. In this case, DM i interacts with the other protocol components through a VM instance vm i l running on CH i . We assume that vm i l has been launched following the TL protocol. The DBSP protocol includes a public and a private encryption scheme, a pseudorandom function for domain key generation, a signature scheme and a random generator. Fig. 3 presents the DBSP protocol mesage flow. DBSP:Setup: We assume that in TL:Setup, each entity has obtained a public/private key pair and published pk.
Assume DM i requests access for a certain VM vm 
where K TTP is a master key that does not leave the security perimeter of TTP, K i k is a symmetric encryption key to confidentiality protect the data and IK ð Þ and calculates the domain key as in DBSP:DomKeyGen, using the existing token n i instead of generating a new one. 4 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now analyse the TL and DBSP protocols in the presence of an adversary. We prove the security of both schemes through a theoretical analysis, showing that our protocols are resistant to the attacks presented in Section 3.3.
Proposition 1 (VM Substitution Soundness).
The TL protocol is sound against the VM substitution attack.
Proof. An adversary ADV trying to launch vm 6 ¼ vm i l on CH can only get vm accepted by DM i if the last mutual authentication step in the trusted launch procedure is successful. In turn, this step only succeeds if at least one of the following two options is true: a. The secure component SC uses a different token, t 0 6 ¼ t accepted by DM i in the final secure channel establishment. b. The secure component SC on CH uses the very same token t used by DM i when launching vm i l . Option a can only succeed if ADV can break the mutual authentication in the secure channel setting. Given that the selected secure channel scheme is sound and t is sufficiently long and selected using a sound random generation process, the ADV fails to break the last protocol step. Hence, as long as the secure channel protocol is sound, the overall protocol construction is also sound against this attack option.
Option b can only succeed if the adversary either manages to guess a value t 0 ¼ t when launching vm or 
when DM i launches vm i l , by attacking any of the protocol steps preceding the final mutual authentication step. A successful attack in this case has the probability t 0 ¼ t equals to 1=2 n , where n is the length of the token value and is infeasible if n is large enough. Below, we show why the adversary also fails with respect to the last option.
TL:Token. Assume the adversary intercepts the TL:Token message. Then the adversary has two options: she might either try to modify the TL:Token message (option 1) with the goal to replace the association between t and the vm i l with t and vm, or she might try obtain the secret value t (option 2) and then launch vm with this t value on an arbitrary valid provider platform. We discuss both these options below.
-TL:Token Option 1: A modification can only be achieved by the adversary by either breaking the public key encryption scheme used to produce c 1 or trying to make this modification on c 1 by direct modification (without first decrypting it) and sign the modified c 1 with an own selected private key. The former option fails due to the assumption of public key encryption scheme soundness and the latter due to that modifying a public encrypted structure without knowledge of the private key is infeasible. -TL:Token Option 2: Direct decryption of c 1 fails due to the assumption of soundness of the public key encryption scheme used to produce c 1 . The only remaining alternative for the adversary is relaying the TL:Token to a platform CH 0 2 CH SP i , which is under the full control of the adversary. Further, ADV follows the protocol and issues the command TL:AttestRequest using the intercepted c 1 , AttestData and s AIK . However, this fails at the TL:Attestation step since AttestData does not contain a valid AIK certificate unless the adversary has managed to get control of a valid platform in the provider network with a valid certificate or she has managed to break the AIK certification scheme. The former option violates the assumption of physical security of the provider computing resources while the latter option violates the assumption of a sound public key and AIK certification schemes. TL:AttestRequest. The adversary could either try to impersonate this message with the goal of obtaining t or the association between t and vm i l . This impersonation attempt fails as the whole sent structure is signed with the pk AIK with a secure public key signing scheme. Furthermore, attempts to resend an old valid TL:AtttestRequest fail as the H 1 verification that the SC receives in return fails as it does point on the old VM. Similarly, any attempts to modify TL:AttestRequest fail as the whole structure is signed with a secure signature scheme. TL:Attestation. Any attempt by the adversary to obtain t would be equal to breaking the public key encryption of TL:AttestToken. Similarly, any attempt to modify c 2 fails due to the fact that modification of a public encrypted structure without knowledge of the private key is unfeasible if the public key encryption scheme is sound. Any attempt by the adversary to replace an old recorded valid TL:AttestToken message fails as such messages do contain a VM image hash H 1 different than the one expected by the SC. t u Proposition 2 (CH Substitution Soundness). The TL protocol is sound against the CH substitution attack.
Proof. DM i intends to launch a virtual machine vm i l on an arbitrary compute host CH i with a security profile SP i . An adversary ADV trying to launch vm i l on CH j 2 CH SP j , SP j 6 ¼ SP i , can only get vm i l accepted by DM i if the last mutual authentication step in the trusted launch procedure is successful. In turn, this step can only succeed if at least one of the following two options is true: a. The secure component SC is using a different token, t 0 6 ¼ t that is accepted by DM i in the final secure channel establishment. b. The secure component SC on CH j is using the very same token t used by DM i when launching vm i l . Option a is impossible as proved in Proposition 1. Option b can only succeed if the adversary either manages to guess a value t 0 ¼ t when launching vm i l or manages to induce the TTP to seal the token t to the configuration of CH j . Finding t 0 ¼ t is infeasible for the adversary as shown in Proposition 1. Below, we show why the adversary also fails with respect to the second option.
Assume ADV intercepts the TL:Token message. Then it has two options: either attempt to launch vm i l on a compute host CH j = 2 CH SP i or on CH j 2 CH SP i .
-TL:Token CH j = 2 CH SP i : The ADV can replace the following information from the TL:Token message: SP i with SP j , pk DM i with pk ADV , which is a public key generated by the ADV and s c 1 with s ADV ¼ Sign sk ADV ðc 1 Þ. By doing this, she can successfully proceed beyond the TL:AttestRequest step since SC is not able to detect the substitution. However, this attack fails at the TL:Attestation step since the AttestData sent to the TTP evaluates to a security profile SP j 6 ¼ SP i in contradiction with the preference of DM i contained in c 1 .
-TL:Token CH j 2 CH SP i : The ADV can replace the following information from the TL:Token message: pk DM i with pk ADV , which is a public key generated by the ADV Attack Storage Encryption Scheme: The remaining option for the ADV in this case is to directly break the disc encryption scheme. However, this is infeasible according to the disc encryption scheme soundness. Option b: According to this option, the ADV tries launching vm i l using TL:Token on a platform with profile SP j using its own credentials. The following impersonation alternatives are available:
Own token: The adversary ADV sends a TL:Token message required by the protocol:
SP j ; pk ADV ; r; s ADV , where H 2 either is the hash of pk DM i or the hash of pk ADV . If the first option is used, the SC obtains in return to TL:AttestRequest, i.e. the TL:Attestation message, a sealed value with a hash H 0 2 6 ¼ H 2 which causes the SC to abort the launch. If the second option is used, the complete launch procedure succeeds as expected. However, when the SC later requests the key for SR i using the DBSP: DomKeyReq message, it includes the hash H 2 of the the ADV public key (pk ADV ) in the encrypted and signed request. ADV cannot change the hash value in this request unless she breaks the signature scheme of the request. Upon receiving the request, TTP identifies that ADV is not allowed to access D 
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
We next describe the implementation of the TL and DBSP protocols followed by experimental evaluation results.
Test Bed Architecture
We describe the infrastructure of the prototype and the architecture of a distributed EHR system installed and configured over multiple VM instances running on the test bed.
Infrastructure Description
The test bed resides on four Dell PowerEdge R320 hosts connected on a Cisco Catalyst 2960 switch with 801.2 q support. We used Linux CentOS, kernel version 2.6.32-358.123.2. openstack.el6.x86_64 and the OpenStack IaaS platform 5 (version Icehouse) using KVM virtualization support. The prototype IaaS includes one "controller" running essential platform services (scheduler, PKI components, SDN control plane, VM image storage, etc.) and three compute hosts running the VM guests. The topology of the prototype SDN reflects three larger domains of the application-level deployment (front-end, back-end and database components) in three virtual LAN (VLAN) networks.
The compute hosts use libvirt 6 for virtualization functionality. We modified libvirt 1.0.2 and used the "libvirthooks" infrastructure to implement the SC for the TL and DBSP protocols. SC unlocks the volumes on compute hosts and interacts with the TPM and TTP (see Fig. 4 ). It uses a generic server architecture where the SC daemon handles each request in a separate process. An inter process communication (IPC) protocol defines the types of messages processed by the SC. The IPC protocol uses sychronous calls with several types of requests for the respective SC operations; the response contains the exit code and response data. A detailed architecture of SC, including the main libraries that it relies on, is presented in Fig. 5. 
Application Description
The prototype also includes a distributed EHR system deployed over seven VM instances. This system contains one client VM, two front-end VMs, two back-end VMs, a database VM and an auxiliary external database VM. Six of the VM instances operate on Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2, with one VM running the client application operates on Windows 7. The components of the EHR system communicate using statically defined IP addresses on the respective VLANS described in Section 6.1.1. Load balancing functionality provided by the underlying IaaS allots the load among front-end and back-end VM pairs. The hosts of the cluster are compatible with the TL protocol, which allows an infrastructure administrator to perform a trusted launch of VM instances on qualified hosts. Similarly, the infrastructure administrator can apply the DBSP protocol to protect sensitive information stored on the database servers.
Performance Evaluation
Trusted launch. Fig. 6 shows the duration of a VM launch over 100 successful instantiations: the TL protocol extends the duration of the VM instantiation (which does not include the OS boot time) on average by 28 percent. However, in our experiments we have used a minimalistic VM image (13.2 MB), based on CirrOS, 7 while launching larger VM images takes significantly more time and proportionally reduces the overhead induced by TL.
DBSP Processing time. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the time required to process a storage unlock request, an average of 10 executions. Processing a volume unlock request on the prototype returns in %2.714 seconds; however, this operation is performed only when attaching the volume to a VM instance and does not affect the subsequent I/O operations on the volume. A closer view highlights the share of the contributing components in the overall overhead composition. Table 1 clearly shows that the TPM unseal operation lasts on average %2.7 seconds, or 99.516 percent of the execution time. According to Section 4.2, in this prototype we use TPMs v1.2, since a TPM v2.0 is not available on commodity platforms at the time of writing. Given that the vast majority of the execution time is spent in the TPM unseal operation, implementing the protocol with a TPM v2.0 may yield improved results.
DBSP Encryption Overhead. Next, we examine the processing overhead introduced by the DBSP protocol. Fig. 7 presents the results of a disk performance benchmark obtained using IOmeter. 8 To measure the effect of background disk encryption with DBSP, we attached two virtual disks to a deployed server VM described in 6.1.2. The storage volumes were physically located on a different host and communicating over iSCSI. We ran a benchmark with two parallel workers on the plaintext and DBSP-encrypted volumes over 12 hours. Next, we disabled in the host BIOS the AES-NI acceleration, created and attached a new volume to the VM and reran the benchmark. This has produced three performance data result sets: plaintext, DBSP encryption and DBSP encryption with AES-NI acceleration. Fig. 7 summarises the total IO, read IO and write IO results. It is visible that the measurements '4 KiB aligned (DBSP) with AES-NI' and '1 MiB (DBSP) with AES-NI' are roughly on par with the plaintext baseline: '4 KiB aligned' and '1 MiB'. The performance overhead induced by background encryption is at 1.18 percent for read IO and 0.95 percent for write IO. We can expect that this performance penalty will be further reduced as the hardware support for encryption is improved. Disk encryption without hardware acceleration ('4 KiB aligned (DBSP)' and '1 MiB (DBSP)') is significantly slower, as expected, with a performance penalty of respectively 49.22 and 42.19 percent (total IO). It is important to reemphasize that the runtime performance penalty is determined exclusively by the performance of the disk encryption subsystem. DBSP only affects the time required to unlock the volume when it is attached to the VM instance, as presented in Table 1 .
APPLICATION DOMAIN
The presented results are based on work in collaboration with a regional public healthcare authority to address some of its concerns regarding IaaS security. We have deployed the prototype described in Section 6, further extended by integrating a medication database, and evaluated it through end-user validation and performance tests. Our results demonstrate that it is both possible and practical to provide strong platform software integrity guarantees to IaaS tenants and efficiently isolate their data using established cryptographic tools. Platform integrity guarantees allow tenants to take better decisions on both workload migration to the cloud and workload placement within IaaS. This contrasts with the current, "flat" trust model, where all IaaS hosts declare the same -but unverifiable for the tenant -trust level.
An essential conclusion of this practical exercise is that the additional cost of providing security guarantees can be effectively offset by composing cloud services from different competing providers, without having to delegate the trust among these providers. Thus, in our cloud model the tenant can purchase cheaper cloud disk storage without any additional risk for data confidentiality.
Another conclusion is that while organizations operating on sensitive data, e.g. public healthcare authorities, consider the risks of migrating data to IaaS clouds as unacceptable, the majority of available providers use commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) cloud platforms with limited capabilities to enhance the security of their deployments, failing to meet the customer requirements. This demonstrates the need to incorporate integrity verification and data protection mechanisms into popular COTS cloud platforms by default. We hope that these important lessons will inspire new secure, usable and cost-effective solutions for cloud services.
On the practical side, specifically regarding the role of the TTP, we envision two scenarios. The TTP could either be managed by the tenant itself (for organizations with enough resources and expertise), or by an external organization (similar to a certificate authority). The first scenario allows the tenant to retain the benefits of cloud services along with additional security guarantees. Similarly, in the second scenario, smaller actors can obtain the same benefits without the need to invest into own attestation infrastructure. In both scenarios, in order to protect the cloud provider the TTP would only operate on a physical slice of the resources (i.e., a subset of compute hosts) that correspond to the respective tenant domains.
CONCLUSION
From a tenant point of view, the cloud security model does not yet hold against threat models developed for the traditional model where the hosts are operated and used by the same organization. However, there is a steady progress towards strengthening the IaaS security model. In this work we presented a framework for trusted infrastructure cloud deployment, with two focus points: VM deployment on trusted compute hosts and domain-based protection of stored data. We described in detail the design, implementation and security evaluation of protocols for trusted VM launch and domain-based storage protection. The solutions are based on requirements elicited by a public healthcare authority, have been implemented in a popular open-source IaaS platform and tested on a prototype deployment of a distributed EHR system. In the security analysis, we introduced a series of attacks and proved that the protocols hold in the specified threat model. To obtain further confidence in the semantic security properties of the protocols, we have modelled and verified them with ProVerif [33] . Finally, our performance tests have shown that the protocols introduce a insignificant performance overhead. This work has covered only a fraction of the IaaS attack landscape. Important topics for future work are strengthening the trust model in cloud network communications, data geolocation [34] , and applying searchable encryption schemes to create secure cloud storage mechanisms. Our results show that it is possible and practical to provide strong platform software integrity guarantees for tenants and efficiently isolate their data using established cryptographic tools. With reasonable engineering effort the framework can be integrated into production environments to strengthen their security properties.
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